We are concerned regarding the recent Presidential election in Iran, and a number of positions the US government seems to be adopting regarding this situation. Multiple indications of massive fraud have made the official election results completely non-credible, and the limited recount process has itself been tainted. Millions of ordinary Iranian took to the streets in peaceful protest demanding “Where is my vote?”, and the government responded with a violent crackdown, mass arrests, further censure and closure of all forms of independent media, and attempted intimidation of the population. This is a coup, and should be recognized as such by the international community.

In response to this upsurge of democratic sentiment in the Iranian people and illegal (according to its own constitution) response by the Iranian government, we urge to observe three important points in the development of the US response to these recent events in Iran.

1] OPPOSE ANY MILITARY CONFRONTATION WITH IRAN.  Such confrontation, by any party, will only have reverse effects; it will lead to further crackdown on all democratic opposition in Iran, which will be accused of collaborating with the enemy, and it will lead to an upsurge of nationalist feelings which will only consolidate the regime of coup d’etat

2] REFRAIN FROM IMPOSING FURTHER ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. As the 1990’s sanctions against Iraq demonstrated, such sanctions will harm ordinary people much more than the regime. They will hollow out civil society and drain the ability and willingness of the general population to resist political oppression. They will breed more resentment against the perpetrators of sanctions than the regime of the coup d’etat.

3] REFRAIN FROM ANY AND ALL NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE REGIME OF THE COUP D’ETAT. President Obama has repeatedly stated his willingness to proceed with negotiations with Iran, and the US has interests in negotiating with Iran over a host of geopolitical issues. But an incentive for the coup has been the prospect of shutting out all internal Iranian reformist and independent political and economic voices from the negotiations. The US should recognize that refusing to engage with this illegitimate government will weaken its internal support, and is a strong pressure point against Ahmedinejad. The US should refrain from any and all negotiations with the current Iranian administration, until a democratically elected president of the Iranian people is allowed to represent that country.

Posted Jan 09

“Iran now poses the greatest strategic challenge to the United States in the region in a generation…. As President, I will do everything in my power to eliminate that threat, and that must begin with direct, aggressive, and sustained diplomacy.”

–Senator Barack Obama

Introduction

The Middle East will figure prominently in the realm of foreign policy challenges faced by the next President of the United States. In addition to its position as an important source of energy in the world, the Middle East is also the most over-militarized region in the world as well as one suffering from a chronic democracy deficit. The next American President will have to deal with the continuing challenges of the Iraq War, the resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the political stalemate in Lebanon, and the prospects of a nuclear armed Iran among others. Ironically enough, Iran, might hold the key to the success or failure of any attempts to solve the above mentioned problems. In a recent column in the New York Times, Thomas Friedman wrote:

“That is the real umbrella story in the Middle East today — the struggle for influence across the region, with America and its Sunni Arab allies (and Israel) versus Iran, Syria and their non-state allies, Hamas and Hezbollah. As the May 11 editorial in the Iranian daily Kayhan put it, “In the power struggle in the Middle East, there are only two sides: Iran and the U.S.” For now, Team America is losing on just about every front.”

As a segment of the politically active Iranian-American community we wish for a peaceful and just settlement of the outstanding issues between our motherland and our beloved adopted homeland. In what follows we have articulated the contours of a set of proposals that we hope an Obama Administration will take to heart as it tries to address concerns about Iran. We will be more than happy to elaborate on any of these points if needed.

What is the end goal of the Obama Administration when it comes to Iran?

One of the major criticisms of the Bush Administration policy towards Iran was that there was no clear indication of whether the end goal was to isolate Iran, to prevent it from enriching uranium, or to bring about regime change. The Bush Administration kept talking about deadlines and redlines which were by and large ignored by the Iranian regime. President Bush consequently found himself in the predicament of having to constantly move the goal post without securing the desired concessions from the Iranian interlocutors.

In the present American political landscape Iran-bashing is a no cost activity for many politicians. We do recognize that if President Obama follows up on his campaign pledge of negotiating with the Iranian leaders, he will be subjected to such epithets as “appeaser.” However, the enormity of the challenges facing the United States does indeed call for the “audacity of hope” and the imperative of “change.” In the eyes of average Iranians, President Obama, as the first African-American President, will come to office without much of the baggage that handicapped his predecessors. Furthermore, if the assessment of most intelligence experts is correct, that Iran is at least several years away from having enough nuclear material to make a nuclear weapon. The time for bold action is now.

Instead of following the failed policies of past presidents, the Obama Administration should abandon a set of erroneous assumptions about Iran that have become accepted wisdom among certain policy circles and instead follow a realistic set of policies towards that country. We have outlined these issues below.

• Iran and the U.S. simultaneously lending support to the Afghan Mujahidin as they fought the Soviet Union.
• Tacit approval of Coalition forces expelling Saddam from Kuwait in 1990 and the toppling of Saddam in 2003.
• Iran providing important aid in the course of the overthrow of the Taliban and helping with the signing of the new Constitution of Afghanistan.

Contentious Issues:

The nuclear issue: It is obvious that the nuclear cleavage has obscured more promising approaches to U.S.-Iranian relations. As a stridently nationalistic people, the Iranians believe that as a sovereign nation they should have the right to develop peaceful nuclear energy. Graduating to the ranks of nuclear powers and becoming a nuclear literate state has a lot of popular support in Iran. Most Iranians delink the present regime from defending the integrity and national interest of their country and maintain that Iran can’t allow other nations to decide its energy policy for it. Naturally the United States is concerned about proliferation of nuclear weapons and insists on transparency. While the Bush Administration’s policy of no enrichment was a non-starter for the Iranians, there is no reason why the two sides can’t compromise on a solution revolving around acceptance of limited enrichment coupled with intrusive inspections by IAEA.

Iraq: Candidate Obama has already said that he is not interested in the prolonged presence of American forces in Iraq. If Obama does not want to suffer the fate of President Lyndon Johnson, it is crucial that he bring the Iraqi fiasco to a closure quickly. Iran shares an interest with the US in insuring that Iraq does not become a failed state and a haven for Al-Qaeda and other terrorists. The Iranians know very well that the violence in Iraq can spill over to their own territory (ethnic unrest, Shia-Sunni conflicts, blowing up of gas and oil pipelines and Kurdish demands for independence) and can be co-opted with skillful diplomacy.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict: The increasing leverage by Iran over such groups as Hamas, Hezbollah, and Islamic Jihad is testimony to the ever changing nature of actors and alliances in this conflict. It is naïve to hope to bring this conflict to an end without involving Iran in some way. Students of Middle East politics know that Iran looks at these groups as political-military assets that could be contained, modified or transformed if the “price is right.” We should keep in mind that Iran, which used to support Amal with arms in the 1980s, did agree to allow it to transform itself into a social and political organization. Nor should we mistake the inflammatory “rhetoric diplomacy” of Ahmadinejad about the Holocaust or annihilating Israel from the more calculating and realistic policy that has been the hallmark of the Iranian position vis-à-vis Israel for the last three decades. We should keep in mind that the clerical leadership of Iran since Khomeini has displayed none of that reckless daring of risks or aggressive miscalculations that was a chief feature of the regime of Saddam Hussein.

Human Rights: When it comes to human rights and personal-political freedoms, the Iranian state has a terrible record. The next American administration should continue to put pressure on the Iranian state to improve the human rights conditions in Iran. However, this needs to be done in a consistent and multilateral fashion for the entire region. Exempting authoritarian allies from such pressure will only lend credence to the Iranian government’s argument that the West uses human rights in a politicized fashion.

Conclusion

By way of conclusion we would like to offer the following recommendations:

• Direct Negotiations: The inauguration of talks between these two nemeses will not necessarily result in a happy ending for all. However, the present stalemate is not an optimal formula to pursue for the next four or eight years. The U.S. can’t effectively negotiate through third parties, such as the Europeans or non-governmental organization, to vouchsafe US interests and it is reasonable to expect the Iranian power to continue to rise in the Middle East.

• Security Arrangement: Instead of talking of regime change and isolation Iran, the US should try to work out a comprehensive security arrangement with Iran. The worst possible course of action is of course a military confrontation with Iran. Short of an all out invasion and occupation, which is becoming increasingly unrealistic, a military attack will not cause the downfall of the state. If such action were taken, the regime would be able to unite the country behind it -- just as it did during the hostage crisis, the Iran-Iraq war, and the aftermath of President Bush’s “axis of evil” speech. We believe that over the last thirty years the Iranian leadership has demonstrated that it is not a suicidal regime. They are more interested in staying in power than in exporting their revolution.

• Empower Civil Society: Instead of once again trying the failed policies of the past, the Obama Administration can think more creatively about how it can empower civil society institutions in Iran. For example, the US can abandon its opposition to Iran joining the WTO and instead encourage such a move as it will help to eventually release Iran’s economy from the yoke of the state. This will be paying much more substantial dividends than trying to ignite ethnic unrest or allocating funds for toppling the regime.

• Alternative Strategies: The June 2009, Iranian presidential election might create a more desirable atmosphere. Many influential conservatives (Rezaei, Larijani, Ghalibaf, Mahdavi Kani, etc.) now believe that Ahmadinejad has overplayed his hand with the nuclear issue and has been reckless in his domestic policies. Ahmadinejad’s potential rivals (Karoubi, Khatami(s), Ghalibaf and Velayati) will all be more moderate on the nuclear issue.